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Metacognitive deficits in bilingualism 
   Abstract 
Recent research indicating that bilingualism is associated with enhanced executive function 
suggests that this enhancement may operate within a broader spectrum of cognitive abilities 
than previously thought  (e.g., Stocco & Prat, 2014). In this study, we focus on metacognition 
or the ability to evaluate one’s own cognitive performance (Flavell, 1979). Over the course of 
two experiments, we presented young healthy adult monolinguals and bilinguals with a 
perceptual two-alternative-forced-choice task followed by confidence judgements. Results 
from both experiments indicated that bilingual participants showed a disadvantage in 
metacognitive efficiency, determined through the calculation of Meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2014). Our findings provide novel insight into the potential differences in bilingual and 
monolingual cognition, which may indicate a bilingual disadvantage. Results are discussed 
with reference to the balance of advantages versus disadvantages associated with 
multilanguage learning. 
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1.1. Introduction 
1.1.1. Bilingual cognition 
Previous research has found bilingual children and adults to outperform their monolingual 
peers on tasks requiring the inhibition of irrelevant information (e.g., Bialystok, Craik, Klein, 
& Viswanathan, 2004; Martin-Rhee & Bialystok, 2008), shifting from one set of information 
to another (e.g., Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & Martin, 2004), as well as updating information 
in working memory on tasks with high processing demands (Bialystok et al., 2004; Carlson &  
Meltzoff, 2008). The bilingual advantage in executive function has been associated with a 
range of bilingual experiences, cross-culturally, and across the lifespan (Bialystok et al., 
2004; Bialystok & Viswanathan, 2009) consistent with claims that both languages of 
bilingual individuals are concurrently active at all times, even in unilingual contexts 
(Dijkstra, Timmerman, & Schriefers, 2000; Van Hell & Dijkstra, 2002; Dijkstra & Van 
Heuven, 1998; 2002). Therefore, for a bilingual speaker, active suppression of the non-target 
language may be required (Green, 1986; 1998; though note the alternative explanation of 
semantic facilitation discussed in Costa & Caramazza, 1999; Costa, 2005; Mahon, Costa, 
Peterson, Vargas, & Caramazza, 2007) as well as shifting mechanisms (Green & Abutalebi, 
2013). As a result of this continuing inhibitory demand, bilingualism is thought to ‘train the 
brain’ and enhance executive function beyond the domain of language (Abutalebi & Green, 
2007; Hernandez, Bates, & Avila, 1996; Mechelli et al., 2004; Stocco, Yamasaki, Natalenko, 
& Prat, 2014).  
Recently, the ‘bilingual advantage hypothesis’ has been challenged by reports of no 
significant group differences or methodological issues (Paap, Johnson, & Sawi, 2014; Paap, 
& Greenberg, 2013; Paap, Sawi, Dalibar, Darrow, & Johnson, 2014) including bias towards 
the publication of confirmatory findings (de Bruin, Treccani, & Della Sala, 2015). According 
to the work of Paap and colleagues, as well as others (e.g., Duñabeitia et al., 2014; Gathercole 
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et al., 2014; Morton & Harper, 2007), there are no empirical grounds to believe that 
bilingualism is associated with enhanced executive function.  
Broader approaches to bilingual cognition have provided important insights. For 
example, recent research suggests that bilingualism is associated with advantages in 
monitoring visual conflict (Costa, Hernández, Costa-Faidella, & Sebastián-Gallés, 2009; 
Costa, Hernández, and Sebastián-Gallés, 2008), speed of rule-based learning (Stocco & Prat, 
2014), Theory of Mind (Rubio Fernández & Glucksberg 2012), exercising perceptual-level 
rather than response-level inhibition (Blumenfeld & Marian, 2014), adjusting proactive and 
reactive control (Morales, Gómez-Ariza, & Bajo, 2013), and controlling verbal interference 
during speech comprehension (Filippi, Leech, Thomas, Green, & Dick, 2012; Filippi et al., 
2014). Overall, it appears that research successfully demonstrates a bilingual advantage using 
paradigms that require the use of multiple components of executive functioning, rather than 
inhibitory control in particular. 
One area of interest that has not, to date, received attention in the literature is whether 
metacognitive processes are affected through the development of additional linguistic skills 
(i.e., second or multiple language learning).  Past bilingualism research has addressed 
metalinguistic awareness as well as metacognitive reading strategies in children (García, 
Jiménez, & Pearson, 1998). However, to our knowledge there have been no attempts reported 
in the literature to evaluate general metacognitive abilities in bilingual individuals. 
 
1.1.2. Metacognition 
Metacognition is the ability to evaluate one’s own cognitive processes, or, more informally, 
to have ‘thoughts about thoughts’ (Flavell, 1979; Fernandez- Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; 
Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014). On a theoretical level, this is often modelled as 
a two-level system, with an object level, first order process, and a meta level, second order 
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process (Nelson & Narens, 1994). An important aspect of metacognition is the ability to get a 
subjective sense of one’s cognitive performance (Grimaldi, Lau & Basso, 2015; Peirce & 
Jastrow, 1885). For example, when we identify a familiar-looking face on a crowded street 
we might feel more or less certain that we did see an old friend (or just someone that looked 
like them). In this case, the face categorisation would be the first order process and our sense 
of confidence in the categorisation would reflect a second order process, evaluating the 
fidelity of the first order process.  In many cases, subjective confidence judgements are 
thought to result from an imperfect readout of the uncertainty associated with the first-order 
decisions (Meyniel, Sigman, & Mainen, 2015). 
In experimental psychology, metacognitive performance is often assessed by 
comparing confidence judgements in relation to an objective measure of task performance, 
such as error rate (e.g., De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Schwartz & Díaz, 
2014; Yeung & Summerfield, 2014). When evaluating metacognitive performance three 
terms are of central importance: accuracy, bias, and efficiency (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012, 
2014). Metacognitive accuracy is the extent to which confidence can be used to discriminate 
between correct trials and error trials (Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003). For example, 
if a participant is shown a set of pictures and has to evaluate whether they have seen them 
before, good metacognitive accuracy would result in their confidence judgements being 
consistently higher when they are correct, compared to when they are wrong. Metacognitive 
accuracy appears to be domain-general in healthy people, in the sense that people have 
similar metacognitive accuracy across tasks that require different first order abilities 
(McCurdy et al., 2013; Song et al., 2011; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997). However, note 
that dissociations have been found between metacognition relating to memory and 
metacognition relating to visual discrimination in patients with brain lesions (Fleming et al., 
2014).  
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In order to gain a complete picture of metacognitive performance one must also 
account for metacognitive bias. Metacognitive bias refers to the tendency to generally report 
high- or low confidence, regardless of the quality of the available information, or the 
accuracy of the first order judgement. For example, people tend to be overconfident in certain 
memory tasks (i.e., overestimating how often they are correct), whilst still being able to 
discriminate between correct and incorrect performance (for a review see Hoffrage, 2004). 
Metacognitive efficiency is a signal theoretic concept that refers to how good a person’s 
metacognitive accuracy is given their first order accuracy. Intuitively, this is straightforward: 
imagine two people, Susan and John, performing a memory test. Susan produces fewer errors 
and therefore has better first order accuracy than John. Nevertheless, both participants report 
high confidence for 80% of the correctly remembered items and report high confidence for 
40% of the items when they were wrong. This means that they both demonstrated the same 
level of metacognitive accuracy, because their confidence judgements were equally good at 
discriminating between correct and incorrect trials. However, in a sense John is 
metacognitively superior to Susan, because even though his first order decision process is 
worse, he still shows equally accurate confidence judgements. In our experiment we 
controlled for first order performance to get a pure measure of metacognitive efficiency in 
two ways. First, we used an adaptive staircase to ensure a similar first-order accuracy for the 
experimental task across all participants. Second, we controlled for differences in first order 
performance mathematically.   
Historically, metacognitive accuracy was computed by correlating confidence with 
first order performance within each participant (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Nelson, 
1984). However, this approach has been criticised for its inability to distinguish 
metacognitive accuracy from metacognitive bias (Masson & Rotello, 2009). This problem 
has recently been addressed by Maniscalco and Lau (2012, 2014), who applied signal 
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detection theory (SDT) to metacognition, thus providing separate measures for bias and 
sensitivity. Below follows a non-technical introduction to the SDT framework in relation to 
first and second order performance, to help the interested reader appreciate how 
metacognitive efficiency is quantified (for a more in-depth, technical treatment, see 
Maniscalco and Lau, 2014).  
One of the easiest ways to measure first-order performance in a two-alternative 
discrimination task is simply to count the proportion of hits and compare it to the proportion 
of false alarms. A hit is correctly indicating when a target is present, a miss is failing to 
indicate when a target is present, a false alarm is indicating that a target is present when it is 
not, and a correct rejection is indicating that a target is absent when it is. We can calculate the 
hit rate for the full experiment by dividing the number of hits by the total number of trials 
when the target was present, and the false alarm rate by dividing the number of false alarms 
by the total number of trials when the target was absent. (Note that hit rate + miss rate = 1 
and false alarm rate + correct rejection rate = 1, so the other two measures are superfluous).  
The higher the hit rate relative to the false alarm rate, the better the participant’s first order 
performance. This can be visualised by plotting hit rates on the y-axis and false alarm rates 
on the x-axis. 
 Now say that we want to determine the participant’s discriminatory ability 
independent of their response bias (i.e., their tendency to prefer one response over the other). 
One way to do this would be to change the relative rewards offered for hits versus correct 
rejections and plot different hit rates and false alarm rates for these different incentive 
structures. Such a plot is called a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.  The 
strength of the SDT framework is that, from a single hit ratio-false alarm ratio pairing, it can 
estimate ROC curves that closely match ROC curves estimated from multiple pairings (Green 
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& Swets, 1966). Therefore, SDT allows us to separate response bias from discriminatory 
ability without having to vary the incentive structures of the responses. 
SDT assumes that each response is the result of two factors, the strength of evidence 
on that trial and the response criterion. In the example below, evidence can be ranked from 
“target is definitely absent” to “target is definitely present” (see the x-axis in Figure 1). For 
each trial of a given difficulty, the strength of evidence is drawn from one of two Gaussian 
distributions, based on whether the target is present or not. The intersection of the two 
distributions represents the indecision point, where the evidence is equally strong for the 
target’s presence as for its absence. The evidence on a given trial is evaluated in relation to 
decision criterion, c. If the evidence is greater than c, participants respond that the target is 
present, and if the evidence is less than c, participants respond that the target is absent. c is 
unbiased if it rests on the indecision point (as in the graph), but can be at any position, 
depending on how strongly participants value hits relative to correct rejections.  A 
participant’s overall discriminative ability is quantified as d’, the difference in means of the 
two probability distributions divided by their joint standard deviation. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of signal detection theory (adapted from Maniscalco & Lau, 2014). 
According to signal detection theory, the response of a given trial is determined by two 
factors: the strength of evidence (x-axis) and the response criterion (c). The strength of 
evidence is drawn from one of two Gaussian distributions: the red distribution if the target is 
absent, and the yellow distribution if the target is present. Participants respond “present” if 
the evidence value drawn is to the right of the response criterion, and “absent” if it is to the 
left. A participant’s discriminative ability is quantified as d’, the difference between the 
means of the distributions relative to their joint standard deviation. Confidence can be added 
by introducing additional criteria that distinguish high from low confidence (c1 for when 
participants respond “absent,” and c2 for when participants respond “present”). 
  
SDT can be extended to explain confidence judgements by adding decision criteria for 
different levels of confidence. In Figure 1, any evidence drawn to the left of c 
but to the right of c1 would lead to a low-confidence response that the target is absent, 
whereas any evidence drawn to the left of c1 would be a high-confidence response that the 
target is absent. Conversely, any evidence drawn to the right of c but to the left of c2 would 
c	
d’	
f(evidence|absent)	 f(evidence|present)	
c2	c1	
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lead to a low-confidence response that the target is present, and any evidence drawn to the 
right of c2 would lead to a high-confidence response that the target is present. The confidence 
judgements also allow us to draw an ROC curve from a single incentive structure. We can 
mimic a liberal response criterion by only treating confident absence judgments as absence 
responses, and everything else as present responses. Similarly, we can mimic a conservative 
response criterion by only treating confident “present” judgements as “present” responses and 
everything else as absent responses. 
However, while d’ provides a good estimate of an empirical ROC curve for first-order 
decisions, there is a poor fit between the theoretical ROC curve from d’ and the empirical 
ROC curve from confidence judgments. This implies that information is lost between the 
first-order (present-absent) and second-order (confidence) discrimination. Meta-d’ quantifies 
this information loss by estimating a d’ that fits the ROC curve drawn for the confidence 
judgments. In other words, Meta-d’ estimates the first-order accuracy the participants would 
have had if there were no information loss between first- and second-order judgments. The 
Mratio provides an easy readout of metacognitive efficiency because it is the fraction 
between Meta-d’ and d’, so that a participant with confidence responses that perfectly reflect 
their first order accuracy would have an Mratio of 1 (Fleming & Lau, 2014).  This SDT 
approach to metacognitive performance has been demonstrated to outperform alternatives and 
to give robust measures of metacognitive accuracy and metacognitive efficiency (Barrett, 
Dienes, & Seth, 2013).  
Fernandez-Duque et al. (2000) argue that, on a conceptual level, there are similarities 
between metacognitive processes and executive function. Empirical findings, supporting the 
notion that there may be a connection between metacognition and executive function, 
demonstrate that inhibitory control correlates with the ability to accurately apply rules in 
decision making tasks (Del Missier, Mӓntylӓ, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010; Souchay & Isingrini, 
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2004). It has also been suggested that attentional shifting skills supports the ability to provide 
consistent judgements of performance (Del Missier et al., 2010). Nevertheless, unless a 
firmer evidence base for such links is established, interdependency between metacognitive 
ability and components of executive function will remain speculative.  
 
1.1.3. The current study 
The aim of this study was to explore metacognitive abilities in bilingual individuals. Given 
considerable uncertainty in the literature regarding i. the relationship between metacognitive 
abilities and executive function and ii. the balance of cognitive advantage versus 
disadvantage associated with bilingualism, our key prediction was necessarily tentative: that 
bilinguals would demonstrate a metacognitive advantage.  We compared metacognitive 
efficiency (as expressed by Mratio) between bilinguals and monolinguals in relation to a 
perceptual two-alternative-forced choice task. Because metacognitive performance tends to 
be associated with task performance (Galvin et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), we used 
a perceptual task that allowed us to adjust task difficulty online for each participant, titrating 
performance at around 71% for all participants. This standardisation ensured severely 
restricted variation in task performance across participants, implying that any variation in 
metacognitive performance could not be accounted for by differences in task performance.  
  
 12 
1.2. Methods 
1.2.1. Participants 
We tested sixty-two healthy young adults, thirty-one English monolinguals (Mage = 22.3, SD 
= 3.7, range 18.3 – 34.4; 12 males), and thirty-one bilinguals from a range of linguistic 
backgrounds (Mage = 25.3, SD = 4.5, range 19.6 – 38.3; 13 males). Whilst all participants 
were considered to be ‘young adults’ and recruited with corresponding age restrictions, the 
bilingual group was found to be significantly older than the monolingual group, t(60)=-2.87, 
p = 0.006, d =-0.74. 
The majority of participants were undergraduate students (n = 41), others were postgraduates 
(n = 13) or professionals (n = 8), and all but one participant had attended university. All 
participants gave informed consent prior to testing, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and did not report to have a history of mental or neurological illness. All bilinguals completed 
a language history questionnaire adapted from Li, Sepanski and Zhao (2006) with this 
information summarised in Table 1. Based on the self-rated proficiency scores, the bilingual 
group was characterised as highly proficient.  
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Table 1. Bilingual participants’ language history information 
Linguistic background First language Bulgarian (n = 1) 
Creole (n = 1) 
Dutch (n = 2) 
Farsi (n = 1) 
French (n = 1) 
German (n = 2) 
Hindi (n = 1) 
Hungarian (n = 1) 
Italian (n = 2) 
Lithuanian (n = 1) 
Malayalam (n = 2) 
Polish (n = 7) 
Portuguese (n = 2) 
Romanian (n = 2) 
Sinhalese (n = 1) 
Second language Afrikaans (n = 1) 
English (n = 26) 
Frisian (n = 1) 
Greek (n = 1) 
Gujarati (n = 1) 
Twi (n = 1) 
 Third language English (n = 1) 
Other linguistic background 
information 
Age of first exposure birth - 6 years (n = 15) 
7 - 12 years (n = 9) 
teenage years (n = 7) 
Time spent in the UK 0 - 5 years (n = 16) 
5 - 10 years (n = 9) 
10+ years (n = 6) 
Switch rarely (n = 14) 
sometimes (n = 15) 
frequently (n = 2) 
Self-rated proficiency (1-6) Reading M = 5.1; SD = 0.7 
Writing M = 4.6; SD = 0.9 
Speaking M = 4.8; SD = 0.8 
Listening M = 5.2; SD = 0.7 
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1.2.2. Materials 
We administered standardised measures of working memory and non-verbal reasoning to all 
participants in order to ensure that the groups were comparable with regard to general 
cognitive function. 
 
Working Memory Test 
Working memory was assessed using the digit span task of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale IV (Wechsler, 2008). In this task, participants are asked to repeat a set of single digits 
(between two and nine) after the experimenter. During the first round (eight sets of two trials) 
they are asked to repeat the numbers in the same order; in the second round (seven sets of two 
trials) they have to repeat the numbers in reverse. Each round is terminated once a participant 
has failed to correctly repeat both trials of one set, and a total score is calculated with a 
maximum of thirty points. 
 
Non-verbal reasoning 
Non-verbal reasoning was measured using the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RM; 
Raven & Court, 1986). In this task participants were presented with twelve trials. In each trial 
they were shown an incomplete matrix of black and white abstract figures. Participants were 
asked to identify the missing piece from a selection of eight alternatives and complete all 12 
trials in no more than 10 minutes. None of the participants reached this time limit. 
 
English language proficiency 
In addition to the language history questionnaire, we also measured English language 
proficiency in bilinguals using the picture naming scale of the Bilingual Verbal Ability Tests 
(BVAT; Muñoz-Sandoval, Cummins, Alvarado, & Ruef, 1998). 
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1.2.3. The Dot Discrimination task 
Participants completed a two-alternative-forced-choice task programmed in PsychoPy v. 1.82 
(Peirce, 2009) presented on a 24-inch widescreen monitor using a standard keyboard. A 
MATLAB version of a similar task has previously been used in Fleming et al. (2014). On 
each trial participants saw two white circles on a black background, and indicated whether 
the left or the right circle contained the most dots by pressing the appropriate arrow key on a 
standard computer keyboard. For every trial, one circle was randomly assigned to have 50 
dots; the other circle contained a variable number of dots that was either larger than, or 
smaller than 50. The difference in dots between the two circles was modified throughout the 
experiment by a staircase procedure, so that whenever participants correctly responded to two 
successive trials the task increased in difficulty (one less dot difference between the options) 
and for every failed trial the task became easier (one more dot difference between the 
options). The purpose of the staircase was to normalise first order accuracy at 71% across the 
sample. After each trial participants were asked to indicate their confidence on a sliding scale.  
For a graphical representation of the trial structure see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2. The trial structure of the dot discrimination task for experiment 1. 
Participants completed 8 blocks with 25 trials in each, making up a total of 200 trials. 
Response times were unlimited for both the perceptual choices and the confidence judgments.  
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Prior to beginning the main task, participants were provided with three practice phases. In the 
first phase they were shown pairs of circles with the number of dots indicated in writing 
below the circles. In the second phase participants started making perceptual choices without 
conducting any confidence judgments. These trials started with a 20-item dot difference, 
which first changed in increments of four, then in successively smaller increments down to 
one; this was performed to calibrate the difficulty to each participant. The second phase 
terminated after 8 reversals (i.e., when participants had switched between picking the correct 
and the incorrect option 8 times). Participants received feedback on their choices in the 
second calibration phase. The final phase consisted of 10 trials that simulated the main 
experimental trials in every way, i.e., without performance feedback, and they were asked to 
indicate their confidence in their choice after each trial. All practice trials were excluded from 
all analyses. 
  
1.2.4. Procedure 
 
All participants were tested in one hour-long session at Anglia Ruskin University, 
Department of Psychology in the same room using the same equipment. After informed 
consent was given they completed a short demographics questionnaire and the bilingual 
participants were also asked to complete an adapted version of the language history 
questionnaire by Li, Sepanski and Zhao (2006). We then administered the digit span task, 
Raven’s Matrices as well as the Dot Discrimination task, with task ordering counter-balanced 
across participants. The practice phases of the Dot Discrimination task were presented with 
extensive instructions and participants were encouraged to ask any questions prior to task 
commencement. All participants were given the option of entering into a raffle (using 
rafflecopter.com and blogger.com) for a £25 Amazon voucher that was sent to one randomly 
chosen participant upon completion of the study. 
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1.3. Results section 
1.3.1. Equivalence of groups on control measures 
An analysis of the control measures revealed that both groups performed comparably on 
measures of working memory, t(56.40)=1.71, p=.09, d=0.43 and nonverbal reasoning, 
t(35.98)=-0.54, p=.59, d=0.14. Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 2. 
Therefore, any differences found in metacognitive abilities are unlikely to be attributable to 
group differences in general cognitive functioning. Because working memory differences 
were marginally significant we included working memory as a covariate in all analyses. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for control measures 
 Monolinguals Bilinguals 
 M SD M SD 
Working Memory 
(maximum score: 30) 17.97 4.85 16.03 3.73 
Nonverbal Reasoning 
(maximum score: 20) 
  
9.94 1.65 10.26 1.79 
 
1.3.2. Dot Discrimination Task: First Order Performance 
We compared the bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ performance with regard to their first order 
accuracy (measured by percentage of correct responses), the difficulty of the trials (measured 
by dot difference) and response time of the choice and the confidence judgment (both 
measured in seconds). The results of all these analyses are summarised in Table 3. 
The monolingual group had a mean accuracy of 70.98%, with a standard deviation of 
1.06%, whilst the bilingual group had mean accuracy of 70.79% with a standard deviation of 
1.23%. This indicates that the staircase procedure successfully standardised accuracy across 
participants. There were no significant group differences with regard to trial difficulty, with a 
mean dot difference of 4.64 for the monolinguals and 4.34 for the bilinguals. Additionally, 
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with regards to response time for the confidence judgments there was no difference between 
the groups: the monolingual group took, on average, 1179ms to respond compared to 1112ms 
for the bilinguals. 
However, the groups did differ with regards to choice response time; an independent 
samples t-test showed that bilinguals (M=2679ms, SD=923ms) were significantly faster than 
monolinguals (M=3360ms, SD=1475ms, t(50.38)=-2.18, p=.03, d=0.55).  A random slopes 
multilevel model (MLM) revealed that this relationship was significantly mediated by block 
(See Figure 2; for more detailed information about the MLM fitting see Appendix 1). 
Monolinguals were set to be the reference category for this analysis and all subsequent 
MLMs. The model tells us that the main-effect of group became statistically non-significant 
when the block-group interaction was accounted for (b=283.11, t(64.03)=0.71, p=0.48). The 
main effect of block was also insignificant (b=19.23, t(64.03)=0.61, p=0.54), meaning that 
the response speed of the monolinguals did not change significantly over time, when 
individual variation in intercepts and slopes were accounted for. The bilingual group*block 
interaction was significant (b=-88, t(64.03)=-2.01, p=.05), meaning that bilinguals, as a 
group, became faster as the task progressed. 
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Figure 3. The mean response time for each group, by experimental block. The error bars 
show 95% group-wise confidence intervals. 
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Table 3. Descriptive and inferential statistics for first order performance 
 Monolinguals Bilinguals     
  Mean SD Mean SD t-statistic df 
p-
value Cohen's d 
Accuracy (% 
Correct) 70.98 1.06 70.79 1.23 0.66 58.73 0.51 0.17 
Difficulty (Δ Dot) 4.33 1.07 4.64 1.03 1.25 59.90 0.26 0.29 
Response Time 
Confidence (ms) 1179 318 1112 0.28 0.89 58.77 0.37 0.23 
Response Time 
Choice (ms) 3360 
 
1475 2679 
 
922 2.18 50.38 0.03 0.55 
          
Two participants in the monolingual group displayed outlying values for one variable 
(difficulty and response time, respectively). In order to ensure that these outliers did not 
unduly influence the group-wise comparisons they were both capped at 3 standard deviations 
above the group mean. Capping these values did not change the results for difficulty 
(t(59.78)=1.29, p=.20, d=0.33) or for response time (t(55.17)=2.24, p=.03, d=0.57). 
 
1.3.3. Dot Discrimination Task: Second Order Performance 
To estimate metacognitive efficiency we used the Mratio.  An Mratio was fitted to each 
participant using a hierarchical Bayesian estimation method (MATLAB code available at 
https://github.com/smfleming/HMM). The confidence data was binned into three quantiles 
prior to the Meta-d’ estimation. A two-tailed independent-samples t-test showed that the 
monolingual group had significantly higher Mratios than the bilingual group, t(37.61)=5.09, 
p<0.001, d=1.29 (monolinguals’ M = 0.58, SD = 0.09; bilinguals’ M = 0.49, SD = 0.03). 
Given that the response time of the choices varied across groups over the course of the 
experiment (see Figure 2) and metacognitive processing has been associated with first-order 
response time (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998), we explored whether metacognitive efficiency 
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also varied as a function of time. In order to test this we calculated Meta-d’ separately for the 
first and second half of the experiment and compared the results across the groups. A fixed-
slopes MLM showed that the main effect of group remained significant, when the other 
effects were accounted for (b=-0.03, t(123.70)=2.15, p=.03) and both groups showed reduced 
metacognitive awareness over time (b=-0.10, t(123.70)=-10.05, p<0.001). Most importantly, 
the interaction effect between group and time was significant (b=-0.04, t(123.70)=-2.85, 
p=.005), showing that bilinguals had a greater decrease in metacognitive efficiency between 
T1 and T2 than monolinguals, as illustrated in Figure 3. For further information about the 
MLM model fitting, see Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 4: The mean Mratio for each group for the first and second half of the experiment. 
Error bars represent group-wise 95% confidence intervals. 
 
To further explore whether Mratios are influenced by response time, we tested whether a 
participant’s mean response time predicted their Mratio (Figure 4). We found that response 
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times did not predict Mratios (b>0.01, t(58)=0.26, p=.79) when group affiliation was 
accounted for. 
 
 
Figure 5: The relationship between mean response time and Mratio. The shaded areas show 
boot-strapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
1.3.4. Effects of second language proficiency and working memory 
Given the marked difference between monolinguals and bilinguals, we wanted to test whether 
second language proficiency related to metacognitive ability in the bilingual group. We tested 
this by predicting Mratios from BVAT scores for the bilingual group in a regression model. 
We found that BVAT scores did not significantly predict Mratios in the bilingual group 
(b<0.01, t(29)=0.07, p=0.94). Additionally we tested whether accounting for the significant 
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group difference in age and the trending difference in working memory scores (favouring 
monolinguals) influenced the results reported here. Our analyses revealed that the effects we 
found remained stable in both cases; these control analyses are reported in Appendix 2.  
 
1.4. Experiment 1 Discussion 
We presented young, healthy bilingual and monolingual adults with a two-alternative-forced-
choice task that required them to make a perceptual judgement and subsequently to indicate 
their level of confidence in their choice (metacognitive performance). Task difficulty was 
calibrated for each participant individually and adjusted online throughout the experiment so 
that overall accuracy was set at 71% for each participant. This was implemented to eliminate 
potential effects of first-order task performance on second-order metacognitive performance. 
The findings of this experiment were three-fold. First, the evaluation of first-order 
performance revealed a bilingual advantage in choice response time despite similar levels of 
accuracy and difficulty across both groups, suggesting that bilinguals were better at basic 
perceptual discrimination: bilinguals become faster over time, whilst monolinguals 
maintained a stable response time throughout the dot discrimination task (see section 1.3.2). 
Second, the analysis of second-order performance revealed that monolinguals had 
significantly higher Mratios compared to bilinguals. This indicates that the monolingual 
group demonstrated better metacognitive efficiency (they tended to feel more confident in 
trials they completed correctly and less confident in trials where their performance was 
incorrect, compared to their bilingual peers). Finally, we assessed metacognition over the 
progression of the task, revealing a significant interaction: whilst both groups experienced a 
reduction in metacognitive efficiency over time, this reduction was greater for the bilingual 
group compared to the monolingual group. 
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Research published by Baranski and Petrusic (1998; 2001) offers a possible 
interpretation for our findings.  These authors showed that in tasks where there were no 
external time constraints on choices (as was the case with the current task), choice response 
times increased when participants were asked to make a subsequent confidence judgement 
(compared to only making a choice). Importantly, these choice response times correlated 
positively with metacognitive accuracy (Petrusic & Baranski, 2003). This indicates that, in 
conditions without time constraints, processing of metacognitive judgement takes place 
during the primary decision-making process. 
The potential association between the bilingual response time advantage and 
metacognitive deficit requires two assumptions: First, bilinguals have a processing advantage 
in the networks associated in the first-order response compared to monolinguals. Second, 
both groups have similar levels of efficiency with regard to metacognitive processing. If these 
two assumptions are true, participants who have a more efficient first-order system will make 
decisions more quickly, but their speed will allow the metacognitive system less time to map 
the uncertainty of the decision, thus impairing metacognitive performance. Because 
bilinguals responded faster whilst displaying the same level of accuracy as monolinguals at 
comparable levels of difficulty, we can conclude that their speed advantage reflects a genuine 
processing advantage with regards to the first – perceptual choice. Consequently, bilinguals 
have less information to support their confidence judgements unless their metacognitive 
network has a processing speed advantage similar to that of their first-order network. A 
model that assumes equivalent metacognitive processing speeds but different first-order 
processing speeds thus accounts for our findings. Additionally, this model can explain the 
widening group difference, both in metacognitive performance and response speed, over the 
course of the task. 
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However, there is also a case against this interpretation of our findings.  First of all, 
mean individual response times did not correlate with Mratios for either group (see Figure 4). 
This means that people who responded faster on average were equally metacognitively 
efficient as those that responded slower on average, so between people there was no 
relationship between faster response time and lower-metacognitive accuracy. Second, the 
response times for both groups were excessively long for a perceptual discrimination task, so 
it is conceivable that the difference we found in response times reflects a difference in 
response thresholds rather than a genuine processing advantage for bilinguals. In order to 
address these problems, we ran a second experiment where we capped response times at 1.5 
seconds, whilst maintaining the general structure of the first experiment. 
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2. Experiment 2 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
For the second experiment, we recruited sixty-one participants: thirty-two English 
monolinguals (Mage = 20.4, SD = 0.7, range 19.3 – 22; 7 males) and a group of twenty-nine 
highly proficient bilinguals (Mage = 22.3, SD = 4.7, range 18.2 – 41.4; 6 males). Similarly to 
experiment one, the bilingual group was significantly older than the monolingual group, 
t(29.123)=-2.20, p = 0.04, d =-0.81, although this effect was reduced to a trend when one 
participant was excluded from analysis (see below). All of the participants were 
undergraduate students except for one, who was a postgraduate student. Informed consent 
was provided prior to testing and participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
did not report to have a history of mental or neurological illness. All bilinguals completed a 
language history questionnaire adapted from Li, Sepanski and Zhao (2006). The information 
deriving from this questionnaire is summarised in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Bilingual participants’ language history information 
Linguistic background First language Bengali (n = 2) 
Cantonese (n = 1) 
Chinese (n = 2) 
English  (n = 4) 
French (n = 1) 
German (n = 1) 
Gujarati (n = 1) 
Greek (n = 1) 
Italian (n = 2) 
Korean (n = 1) 
Mandarin (n = 1) 
Nepalese (n = 2) 
Polish (n = 1) 
Portuguese (n = 2) 
Setswana (n = 1) 
Spanish (n = 2) 
Turkish (n = 4) 
Second language English (n = 23) 
Farsi (n = 1) 
French (n = 1) 
Malay (n = 1) 
Punjabi (n = 3) 
 Third language English (n = 2) 
Urdu (n = 1) 
Other linguistic background 
information 
Age of first exposure birth - 6 years (n = 20) 
7 - 12 years (n = 6) 
teenage years (n = 3) 
Time spent in the UK 0 - 5 years (n = 13) 
5 - 10 years (n = 2) 
10+ years (n = 14) 
Switch rarely (n = 13) 
sometimes (n = 14) 
frequently (n = 2) 
Self-rated proficiency (1-6) Reading M = 5.0; SD = 0.9 
Writing M = 4.7; SD = 1.1 
Speaking M = 4.8; SD = 1.1 
Listening M = 5; SD = 1.0 
 
  
 28 
2.1.2. Materials 
General cognitive functioning and English language proficiency were assessed using the 
same measures as outlined in section 1.2.2. 
The Dot Discrimination task 
The dot discrimination task was identical to the task in experiment 1, with the exception that 
participants now had to respond within 1.5 seconds after first seeing the dots. We also 
introduced slightly longer inter-trial intervals which featured a fixation cross in the center of 
the screen (see Figure 5). If participants took longer than 1.5 seconds to respond, the trial was 
terminated and the words “Too Slow”, presented for one second.   
 
Figure 6. The trial structure of the dot discrimination task in experiment 2. 
 
2.1.3. Procedure 
Testing took place at Anglia Ruskin University using the same equipment as in experiment 1. 
Participants completed the dot discrimination task, as well as all the control measures in a 
counterbalanced order.  Participants were offered participation credits, which are part of the 
undergraduate course requirements. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Participant exclusion 
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One participant from the bilingual group was excluded because they were found to have 
reported a confidence of 50% on 88% of the trials of the dot discrimination task. Because the 
confidence marker for the second order performance started at 50%, it is likely that this 
participant simply neglected to provide a confidence judgement for the majority of trials. 
Including this participant in the non-confidence analyses did not alter the direction or 
magnitude of any of the effects reported.  Therefore, we proceeded to analyse the data 
provided by a sample of 60 participants, 28 bilinguals and 32 monolinguals. 
 
3.2.2. Equivalence of groups on control measures. 
Both groups performed comparably on measures of working memory, t(58)=1.01, p=0.32, 
d=0.27 and nonverbal reasoning, t(58)=-0.86, p=0.40, d=-0.23, indicating that the groups 
were matched on general cognitive functioning (see Table 5). However, the bilinguals were 
marginally older than the monolinguals (t(28.29)=1.88, p=.07, d=.50). 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for control measures 
 Monolinguals Bilinguals 
  M SD M SD 
Working Memory (maximum score: 
30) 15.66 3.55 14.93 2.62 
Nonverbal Reasoning                   
 (maximum score: 12) 
 
8.66 2.47 9.21 1.91 
     
3.2.3. Dot discrimination Task: First Order Performance 
Descriptive and inferential statistics are provided in Table 6. There was no difference in 
response times between the groups, either for the choices (t(52.91) = 1.30, p=.20, d=0.33) or 
the confidence judgements (t(56.98)= 0.28, p=.78, d=.07).  Similarly, participants had a 
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similar proportion of invalid trials for responding too slow, namely 2% for monolinguals and 
3% for bilinguals (t(51.88)=1.74, p=.09, d=0.45).  Additionally, both groups had a similar 
average difficulty (t(54.82)=1.02, p=.31, d=0.26),  with 5.85 average dot difference for the 
monolinguals and 5.45 average dot difference for the bilinguals. As in experiment 1, the 
staircase procedure successfully standardised accuracy across participants. The monolingual 
group had a mean accuracy of 71.34%, with a standard deviation of 1.38%, whilst the 
bilingual group had mean accuracy of 70.27% with a standard deviation of 1.04%. Given that 
response time changed over the course of experiment 1, we tested for similar patterns in 
experiment 2. We found that bilinguals were significantly slower than monolinguals when the 
block*group interaction was accounted for (b=86.84, t(57.98)=2.23, p=.03), but that 
bilinguals became faster over time, while monolinguals became slower (b=-10.03, t(57.98)=-
2.32, p=.02), such that the groups converged over the course of the experiment (see figure 6). 
There was no significant main effect of block (b=4.19, t(57.98)=1.42, p=.16). 
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Figure 7: The mean response time of each group, by experimental block. The error bars show 
95% group-wise confidence intervals. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive and inferential statistics for first order performance, experiment 2 
 Monolinguals Bilinguals     
  Mean SD Mean SD T-statistic df p-value Cohen's d 
Difficulty (Δ Dot) 5.85 1.79 5.45 1.22 1.02 54.82 .31 0.26 
Response Time 
Confidence (ms) 1061 443 1035 222 0.28 56.98 .78 0.07 
Response Time 
Choice (ms) 856 151 898 95 1.30 52.91 .20 0.33 
 
3.2.4. Dot discrimination Task: Comparing First Order Performance across experiments  
The participants in experiment two (M=875 ms, SD=128 ms) were significantly faster than 
the fastest group in experiment 1(the bilinguals; M=2679 ms, SD=922 ms; t(30.6)=10.82, 
p<.0001, d=2.73). Response times for confidence judgements did not differ across 
experiments (t(114.48)=1.61, p=0.11, d=0.29). However, incorporation of the speeded 
response requirement affected task difficulty such that in experiment 2 a larger dot difference 
was required (M=4.48, SD=1.06).  
 
3.2.5. Dot discrimination Task: Second Order Performance 
The monolingual group had significantly higher Mratios than the bilingual group 
(t(48.62)=2.70, p=.001, d=0.71), although the magnitude of the effect was smaller than 
experiment 1 (Cohen’s d experiment 1 = 1.29, Cohen’s d experiment 2 = 0.71). This suggests 
that monolinguals have a genuine advantage in metacognitive efficiency, and that the effect 
observed in experiment 1 is not solely due to differences in response times. Next, we ran an 
MLM model to test if metacognitive efficiency decreased over time, as was observed in 
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experiment 1. We computed Mratio for both groups, and we found that bilinguals performed 
significantly worse on metacognitive  ability (b=-22.09, t(123.98)=-3.16, p=.002). 
Additionally, we examined performance in the first and the second half of the task to 
determine whether the groups performed differently as a function of time. The main effect of 
time was not significant (b=0.04, t(123.98)=-0.63, p=.53), and neither was the group*time 
interaction effect (b=0.06, t(123.98)=-0.65, p=.52), as illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 8: The mean Mratio for each group for the first and second half of the experiment. 
Error bars represent group-wise 95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.2.6. Effects of second language proficiency 
Consistent with experiment one we examined whether second language ability predicted 
metacognitive efficiency in the bilingual group. We tested this by predicting Mratios from 
BVAT scores for the bilingual group in a regression model. We found that levels of English 
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proficiency did not significantly predict Mratios in the bilingual group (b=0.01, t(26)=1.07, 
p=0.30). Additionally we tested whether accounting for the marginal group difference in age 
influenced the results reported here. Our analyses revealed that the effects we found remained 
stable in either case; these control analyses are reported in Appendix 2. 
 
3.3. Discussion 
We compared young, healthy monolinguals and bilinguals in a perceptual metacognition 
paradigm, in which participants chose which of two circles contained the most dots and 
subsequently made a confidence judgement about the accuracy of their choice. In contrast to 
experiment 1, where response time was unconstrained, we implemented a 1.5-second 
response threshold on first order responses. We did this to determine whether the differences 
between the language groups in response times and metacognitive efficiency observed in 
experiment 1 would replicate with constrained response times. 
Because of the new design, participants' response times were significantly faster in 
both groups relative to experiment 1. This increase in response speed came at a cost to 
performance as expected by the trade-off between speed and accuracy. However, given the 
staircase procedure we implemented to keep the error-rate constant, this resulted in easier 
trials (i.e., a greater dot difference) compared to experiment 1. Critically, unlike in 
experiment 1, both language groups showed comparable response times during the visual 
discrimination. Additionally, both groups missed a similar number of trials because of 
responding too slowly (3% or less), and the two groups did not differ significantly with 
regard to average trial difficulty.  
With regard to second-order performance, the monolingual group had significantly 
higher Mratios than the bilingual group, in line with experiment 1. As was the case in 
experiment 1, these differences could not be explained in terms of differences in non-verbal 
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reasoning, working memory or age. However, unlike in experiment 1, there was no general 
decrease in Mratios over the course of experiment 2 in either group. Together, these findings 
therefore replicate our key observation in experiment 1, with monolinguals demonstrating 
higher metacognitive abilities compared with the bilingual group. Critically, the new design 
allowed us to confirm that this effect was not due to a difference in first-order performance 
given the undifferentiated response times and error rates across groups observed in 
experiment 2. 
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3. Conclusions 
 
Our study demonstrates a bilingual disadvantage in metacognitive efficiency.  In the first 
experiment we showed that bilinguals had reduced metacognitive efficiency but were also 
significantly faster in their response time compared with the monolingual individuals. 
Nevertheless, this response speed advantage did not reflect superior first-order discrimination 
performance. Given the possibility that the reduced metacognitive efficiency in the bilingual 
group was a consequence of the difference in reaction times (first-order performance) we 
conducted a second experiment in which we implemented a speeded response requirement. 
This new design resulted in both groups responding at similar speeds, but a metacognitive 
efficiency advantage was again observed in monolingual individuals in comparison to 
bilingual individuals.  
 
Our findings might seem at odds with many previous studies that report a bilingual 
advantage in executive function (e.g., Adesope et al., 2010; Bialystok, 2009) and influential 
early work which has suggested links between metacognitive and executive  abilities 
(Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000 Shimamura, 2000). However, whether or not there is direct 
link between metacognitive monitoring and other aspects of executive function is not clear 
from these earlier experiments (and unpublished data from our lab have not provided 
conclusive results). Other studies have failed to find any relationship between task switching 
and meta-cognitive performance measured by the first order discrimination task (Boduroglu, 
Tekcan & Kapucu, 2014; Palmer, David, Fleming, 2014). However, Boduroglu and 
colleagues did find a relationship between set shifting and metacognitive abilities measured 
in a memory task in which participants were required to predict their ability to remember a 
target word from a visual cue, prior to making the memory judgement. It has been proposed 
that metacognitive abilities might be qualitatively different when measured in different 
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domains such as perception or memory (Fleming,  Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014) and 
therefore a link between executive function and metacognition might be domain specific.  
 The difference in metacognitive performance demonstrated here also opens up the 
possibility that monolinguals and bilinguals operate differently with regard to higher-order 
decision making. For example, metacognition has been implicated in tasks that require people 
to judge the value of staying with a current, known option, versus the value of exploring the 
environment and trying something new, the so-called exploration-exploitation trade-off 
(Kolling et al., 2012; Cohen, McClore & Yu, 2007).  
 Studying bilingual speakers/learners is notoriously problematic due to the difficulty in 
controlling the wide range of possible extraneous variables that may frequently operate in 
group comparisons.  Nevertheless, in two separate studies conducted across different 
participant groups, we have identified a robust disadvantage in the bilingual groups operating 
on higher-level cognition. These effects warrant further exploration in the service of 
promoting a more comprehensive account of how language impacts on cognition. 
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Appendix 1, Multilevel model fitting 
 
The multilevel regression analyses reported in this paper were conducted using the lme4 package in R 
(Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011) Degrees of freedom and p-values were obtained using the 
Kenward-Roger approximation, as implemented in the pbkertest package (Halekoh & Hojsgaard, 
2011). 
 
In all regression analyses reported here the monolingual group serves as the reference category, so if 
the t-value for the group variable is positive, bilinguals have higher values than the monolinguals, and 
vice versa. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Response Time Model 
 
Table A1 lists the various models we attempted to fit, figure A1 shows the BIC scores for all the 
response time models. Table A2 show the full model specification for model 3, which is the best-
fitting model, and the model that is reported in the main text of the paper. 
 
Table A1, Response Time Models Experiment 1 
Models Formulas 
Empty RT ~ 1 
Model 1 RT ~ Language Group 
Model 2 RT ~ Language Group + Block + Group*Block 
Model 3 
RT ~ Language Group + Block + Group*Block (Block as a random variable) 
Model 4 RT ~ Language Group + Block + Age + Group*Block (Block as a random 
variable) 
Model 5 RT ~ Language Group + Block + WM + Group*Block (Block as a random 
variable) 
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Figure A1. BIC scores for all the response time models in experiment 1. 
 
Table A2. Response time by language group and experimental block, random slopes 
model 
Effects Variance Coefficients SE t-values DF p 
Random effects       
Participant       
Intercept 2380701      
Block 26127      
Fixed effects       
Intercept  3273 283 11.57 64.03 <0.0001 
Group (Bilingual)  -283 400 -0.71 64.03 0.48 
Block  19 31 0.62 64.03 0.54 
Group*Block  -88 44 -2.01 64.03 0.05 
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Meta d’ Model 
 
Table A3, lists the multilevel models we used to predict Meta d’ for experiment 1. Figure A2 shows 
the BIC scores for all of these models. Table A4 shows the full specifications for the best-fitting 
model (that is reported in the main text of the paper). There are no random-slopes models in this 
comparison because there were too few data points to support such complex models. 
 
Table A3, Mratio Models Experiment 1 
Models Formulas 
Empty Mratio ~ 1 
Model 1 Mratio ~ Language Group 
Model 2 Mratio ~ Language Group + Half 
Model 3 Mratio ~ Language Group + Half + Group*Half 
Model 4 Mratio ~ Language Group + Half + Age + Group*Half 
Model 5 Mratio ~ Language Group + Half + WM + Group*Half 
 
 
 
Figure A2. BIC scores for all the Mratio models for experiment 1. 
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Table A4. Meta-d' by language group and time point, fixed slopes 
Effects Variance Coefficients SE t-values DF p 
Random 
effects 
      
Participant 
      
Intercept 0.0008 
     
Fixed effects 
      
Intercept 
 
0.58 0.009 67.50 123.70 <.0001 
Group 
 
-0.03 0.01 -2.15 123.70 .034 
Time 
 
-0.10 0.01 -10.05 123.70 <.0001 
Group*Tim
e 
 
-0.04 0.01 -2.85 123.70 .005 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Response Time Model 
Table A5 lists the various models we attempted to fit, figure A3 shows the BIC scores for all the 
response time models in experiment 2. Table A6 shows the full model specification for model 3, 
which is the best-fitting model, and the model that is reported in the main text of the paper. 
 
 
  
Table A5, Response Time Models Experiment 2 
Models Formulas 
Empty RT ~ 1 
Model 1 RT ~ Language Group 
Model 2 RT ~ Language Group + Block + Group*Block 
Model 3 
RT ~ Language Group + Block + Group*Block (Block as a random variable) 
Model 4 RT ~ Language Group + Block + Age + Group*Block (Block as a random 
variable) 
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 Figure 
A3. BIC scores for all the response time models for experiment 2. 
 
Table A6. Response time by language group and experimental block, random slopes 
model 
Effects Variance Coefficients SE t-values DF p 
Random effects       
Participant       
Intercept 21450      
Block 242      
Fixed effects       
Intercept  837 26 31.69 58.01 <.0001 
Group (Bilingual)  84 38 2.17 58.01 .03 
Block  4 3 1.42 58.01 .16 
Group*Block  -10 4 -2.21 58.01 .03 
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Meta d’ Model 
 
Table A7, lists the multilevel models we used to predict Meta d’. Figure A4 Shows the BIC score for 
all of these models. Table A8 shows the full specifications for model 3, which is reported in the main 
text of the paper. Note that model 3, was not the best-fitting model in this case, but it was still 
included in the paper to allow for clear comparisons with experiment 1. There are no random-slopes 
models in this comparison because there were too few data points to support such complex models. 
 
Table A7, Mratio Models Experiment 1 
Models Formulas 
Empty Mratio ~ 1 
Model 1 Mratio ~ Language Group 
Model 2 Mratio ~ Language Group + Half 
Model 3 Mratio ~ Language Group + Half + Group*Half 
Model 4 Mratio ~ Language Group + Half + Age + Group*Half 
 
 
Figure A4. BIC scores for all the Mratio models for experiment 2. 
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Table A8. Meta-d' by language group and time point, fixed slopes 
Effects Variance Coefficients SE t-values DF p 
Random 
effects 
      
Participant 
      
Intercept 0.007 
     
Fixed effects 
      
Intercept 
 
0.91 0.047 19.05 123.98 <.0001 
Group 
 
-0.22 0.07 -3.16 123.98 .002 
Time 
 
0.04 0.06 0.63 123.98 .53 
Group* 
Time 
 
0.06 0.01 0.65 123.98 .52 
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Appendix 2. Analyses controlling for potential confounds 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Because age differed significantly between the groups in experiment 1, and working memory 
differed on the trend level, we reran all the analyses with these two covariates, to ensure that 
these differences did not influence our results. 
 
First order analyses 
To see if age or working memory influenced our first order analyses we ran 2 sets of regression 
models that predicted the first order variables from group and adding either age or working memory 
as covariates. Neither covariate altered the findings reported in the main text. 
 
Table A9, Experiment 1 First Order Analyses, Age 
Covariate (df=2, 59) 
 
Group Age 
DV t-value p-value t-value p-value 
Accuracy -1.72 .09 3.06 .003 
Difficulty 1.71 .09 -1.83 .07 
Confidence RT -1.19 .24 1.02 .31 
Choice RT -2.51 .01 1.31 .20 
 
 
Table A10, Experiment 1 First Order Analyses, WM 
Covariate (df=2, 59) 
 
Group WM 
DV t-value p-value t-value p-value 
Accuracy -0.62 .54 0.1 .93 
Difficulty 1.05 .3 -0.19 .85 
Confidence RT -0.62 .54 1.22 .23 
Choice RT -1.89 .06 1.15 .26 
 
 
The bilingualism*block interaction in predicting RT 
To control for the potential influence of age and working memory on the bilingualism*block 
interaction we ran two MLMs, one adding age as covariate, and one adding working memory as a 
covariate. For the age model, bilinguals did not differ significantly from monolinguals (b=-412, 
t(72.95)=-1.01, p=.32), neither was age a significant predictor of response time (b=-43,  
t(72.95)=1.18, p=.24), nor was block (b=-19, t(72.95)=0.62, p=.53). However, the block*bilingual 
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interaction showed that bilinguals responded significantly faster as the task progressed (b=-88, 
t(72.95)=-2.01, p=.05). The exact same pattern was true for the working memory model, with the 
working memory (b=35 t(74.93)=-0.99, p=.32), group (b=-218 t(74.93)=-0.54, p=.59) and block 
(b=19 t(74.93)=-0.61, p=.53) main effects being insignificant, but the block*group interaction being 
significant (b=-88 t(74.93)=-2.01, p=.05). Both of these models show the same pattern of effects as is 
reported in the main text of the paper. 
 
Mratio Analyses 
The main effect of bilingualism 
To examine whether the main effect of bilingualism on Mratio was influenced by working memory or 
age, we constructed a set of regression models, as we did for response time. We found that age was 
not a significant predictor of Mratio (t=0.92, df=2, 59, p=.33), nor did including it in the model alter 
the effect of group on Mratios (t=-5.11, df=2, 59, p<.0001). Similarly, working memory scores did not 
predict Mratios (t=-1.16, df=2, 59, p=.25), nor did including them in the model, change the influence 
of language group (t=-4.72, df=2, 59, p<.0001). Including the covariates in our analysis did not 
change the effect of group on Mratios that is reported in the paper. 
 
The bilingualism * time interaction 
To control for the potential influence of age and working memory on the bilingualism*time 
interaction we ran two additional MLMs, one adding age as covariate, and one adding working 
memory as a covariate. For the age model, we found that age did not significantly predict Mratios 
(b=0.002, t(71.53)=1.24, p=.22), and the effects remained significant for group (b=-0.03, t(71.53)=-
2.43, p=.02) time (b=-0.10, t(71.53)=-10.05, p<.0001) and the group time interaction (b=-0.04, 
t(71.53)=-2.85, p=.006). Similarly, working memory did not predict Mratios (b=0.001, t(74.93)=0.86, 
p=.39), and including working memory did not greatly modify the effects of group (b=0.02, 
t(74.93)=-1.96, p=.05) time (b=-0.10, t(74.93)=-10.05, p<.0001) or the group time interaction (b=.04, 
t(74.93)=-2.85, p=.006). Accounting for the covariates did not change the direction or magnitude of 
the effects reported in the main text. 
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Predicting Mratio from Mean RT 
In the main text we found that Mean RT did not predict a participant’s Mratio. For completeness, we 
ran two additional models to ensure that adding age or WM as covariates would not change this null-
effect. Age did not predict Mratio (t=1.04, df= 4, 57, p=.30), and neither did mean RT (t=0.18, df= 4, 
57, p=.85). Furthermore, there was no significant Group*Mean RT interaction (t=-0.48, df= 4, 57, 
p=.63) but the effect of group was significant (t=2.37, df= 4, 57, p=.02). The same pattern held for the 
WM model: WM did not predict Mratio (t=1.25, df= 4, 57, p=.22), and neither did mean RT (t=0.26, 
df= 4, 57, p=.80), nor the Group*Mean RT interaction (t=-0.56, df= 4, 57, p=.57). However, the effect 
of group was significant (t=2.26, df= 4, 57, p=.03). All of these effects are in line with what is 
reported in the main body of the text. 
 
Experiment 2 
Because age differed significantly between the groups in experiment 2, we reran all the analyses 
with age as a covariate, to ensure that the age difference did not cause our results. 
 
First order analyses 
To see if age influenced our first order analyses we ran regression models where we predicted the first 
order variables from group and adding age as a covariate. We note that age is significant predictor of 
confidence response time and a marginally significant predictor of accuracy, but including age in the 
model does not change the effect of group on any first-order variable. 
 
 
Table A11, Experiment 1 First Order Analyses, Age 
Covariate (df=2, 57) 
 
Group Age 
DV t-value p-value t-value p-value 
Accuracy -3.83 .0005 1.94 .06 
Difficulty -1.26 .21 1.15 .25 
Confidence RT -0.97 .33 2.68 .01 
Choice RT 1.09 .28 0.47 .63 
 
The bilingualism*block interaction in predicting RT 
 56 
To control for the potential influence of age on the bilingualism*block interaction we ran an 
additional MLM, adding age as covariate. Age was not a significant predictor of response time 
(b=3.20, t(58.12)=0.55, p=.58) and neither was block (b=4.19,  t(58.12)=1.42, p=.24). However, there 
was a significant main effect of group (b=79, t(58.12)=1.97, p=.05) and a group*block interaction that 
showed that bilinguals responded significantly faster as the task progressed (b=-9, t(58.12)=-2.21, 
p=.03). All of these effects are in line with what was reported in the main text of the study. 
 
Mratio Analyses 
The main effect of bilingualism 
To examine whether the main effect of bilingualism on Mratio was influenced by age, we constructed 
a regression model predicting Mratio form group and age. We found that age was not a significant 
predictor of Mratio (t=0.01, df=2, 57, p=.99), nor did including it in the model modify the influence of 
group on Mratios (t=-2.64, df=2, 57, p=.01). 
 
The bilingualism * time interaction 
To control for the potential influence of age on the bilingualism*time interaction model we ran an 
additional model, adding age as covariate. For the age model, we found that age did not significantly 
predict Mratios (b=-0.003, t(69.75)=-0.34, p=.73), nor did time (b=0.04, t(69.75)=0.63, p<.53), nor 
did the group*time interaction  (b=-0.06, t(69.75)=0.65, p<.52). However, the main effect for group 
was significant (b=-0.22, t(69.75)=-3.04, p=.003), showing that bilinguals had lower Mratios than 
monolinguals. These findings are in line with the effects reported in the main text of the paper.  
 
 
 
